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Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret Anscombe single-handedly inaugurated the contemporary
study of moral psychology with her magisterial Intention of 1957 and Modern Moral Philosophy
of 1958 (MMP).2 While doing so she focused attention on double-effect reasoning (DER) and its
Intended/Foreseen (or, I/F) distinction, the exclusive purview up to that point of Catholic moral
theologians.3 Here she is in MMP:
[t]he denial of any distinction between foreseen and
intended consequences, as far as responsibility is
concerned, was not made by Sidgwick in developing any
one ‘method of ethics’; he made this important move on
behalf of everybody and just on its own account; and I
think it plausible to suggest that this move on the part of
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Sidgwick explains the difference between old-fashioned
utilitarianism and that consequentialism, as I name it,
which marks him and every English academic philosopher
since him. By it, the kind of consideration which formerly
would have been regarded as a temptation, the kind of
considerations urged upon men by wives and flattering
friends, was given a status by moral philosophers in their
theories.4
In MMP, Anscombe holds that absent acknowledgment of the I/F distinction’s ethical relevance,
one ineluctably descends into that brand of ethics whose now-standard name she coins in the
above passage, Consequentialism. She goes on to say, “[i]t is a necessary feature of
consequentialism that it is a shallow philosophy.” (I will later argue that consequentialism is
shallow, indeed. For, due in part to its denial of the I/F distinction, its act-evaluations remain
entirely on the surface of ethics.)
Subsequently, Anscombe defends disputed aspects of double effect.5 While solely
responsible for the attention given to DER outside of Catholic circles, Anscombe herself
proposes in its stead (or, perhaps more accurately, instead of the prominent corruptions of double
effect familiar to her) what she refers to as the, “principle of side effects.” In what follows, I will
present: first, the salient abuses of double effect that incline Anscombe to offer her, “principle of
side effects”; second, her principle; third, a sound account of double effect (taking Aquinas’
original treatment as a model); fourth and finally, a response to the concern that leads Anscombe
to employ her principle in lieu of double effect.
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I. Corruptions of Double Effect: Cartesianism and Proportionalism.
a. Cartesianism.
In her advocacy of double effect, Anscombe herself always retains a healthy skepticism
concerning accounts of double effect. Indeed, she regards it as a source of corrupt moral
thinking:
[n]ow, to make an epigram, the corruption of non-Catholic
moral thought has consisted in the denial of this doctrine,
and the corruption of Catholic thought in the abuse of it.6
[and,]
we are touching on the principle of “double effect”. The
denial of this has been the corruption of non-Catholic
thought, and its abuse the corruption of Catholic thought.7
As evident in the earlier quote from MMP, Anscombe regards the denial of the I/F distinction as
at the heart of Consequentialism. Hence, she links the denial of double effect to this specific
decline in moral thought. As for the abuse of double effect, she has at least two culprits in mind,
an old one (Cartesianism) and a new one (Proportionalism, the dominant account of Catholic
moral theology regnant from the late 1960's up to the papal encyclical Veritatis Splendor of 1993
which condemns the account). Let us consider the older first.
In her rediscovery of practical knowledge’s distinctiveness, Anscombe constantly battles
a Cartesian conception of mind as entirely speculative:
[c]an it be that there is something that modern philosophy
has blankly misunderstood: namely what ancient and
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medieval philosophers meant by practical knowledge?
Certainly in modern philosophy we have an incorrigibly
contemplative conception of knowledge. Knowledge must
be something that is judged as such by being in accordance
with the facts. The facts, reality, are prior and dictate what
is to be said, if it is knowledge. And this is the explanation
of the utter darkness in which we found ourselves [at the
outset of the investigation of intention]. For if there are two
knowledges – one by observation, the other in intention –
then it looks as if there must be two objects of knowledge;
but if one says the objects are the same, one looks
hopelessly for the different mode of contemplative
knowledge in acting, as if there were a very queer and
special sort of seeing eye in the middle of acting.8
The, “very queer and special sort of seeing eye,” is, of course, the subject of Descartes’, “cogito
ergo sum,” (“I think, therefore, I am”) the, “res cogitans,” (“thing thinking”). This Cartesian
subjectivism leads to the (erroneous) position that Anscombe (wo)manfully argues against in
Intention:
that if we wish to understand what intention is, we must be
investigating something whose existence is purely in the
sphere of the mind; and that although intention issues in
actions, and the way this happens also presents interesting
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questions, still what physically takes place, i.e., what a man
actually does, is the very last thing we need consider in our
enquiry. Whereas I wish to say it is the first.9
The conception of the acting subject as uniquely authoritative concerning his intent leads to one
(apparently chronic) abuse of double effect.10 Three centuries before Anscombe, Pascal
lampoons it as the, “grande méthode de diriger l’intention.”11 Anscombe calls this abuse,
“absurd,” and, “ludicrous.” One finds her most famous reference to this error in Intention:
it would appear that we can choose to have a certain
intention and not another, just by e.g. saying within
ourselves: ‘What I mean to be doing is earning my living,
and not poisoning the household’; or ‘what I mean to be
doing is helping those good men into power; I withdraw my
intention from the act of poisoning the household, which I
prefer to think goes on without my intention being in it’.
The idea that one can determine one’s intentions by making
such a little speech to oneself is obvious bosh. (original
emphases)12
To put paid to the error and to redeem her claim of, “bosh,” Anscombe presents an argument:
[i]s there ever a place for an interior act of intention? I
suppose that the man I imagined, who said ‘I was only
doing my usual job’, might find this formula and administer
it to himself in the present tense at some stage of his
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activities. However, if he does this, we notice that the
question immediately arises: with what intention does he do
it? This question would always arise about anything which
was deliberately performed as an ‘act of intending’.13
An intention concerning one’s intention (a second-order intention – of course, we have such
intentions, in fact, ethics generally and moral reform specifically would seem to depend upon
them) does not escape scrutiny; rather, it gives rise to it. That is, why does one employ the grand
method? “To elude the constraints of morality,” or (less objectionably, but still problematic), “to
render my otherwise impermissible act permissible,” hardly exemplifies the troubled consciences
that have legitimate recourse to casuistry. (Now largely a pejorative term, but one that originates
in the Latin casus conscientiae, or “case of conscience.”)14
The Cartesian emphasis upon the special authority of the acting subject (conceived of as
entirely mental and “inside” – yet utterly distinct from – the body) seems to give rise to the grand
method.15 Why would this be so? Perhaps the unquestioned or privileged authority of the agent
leads to the idea that the agent need only express, as it were, an alternative intention and, voilà,
that would be his intent. This account conceives of intent as if it were simply a sentence, or
something the agent says to himself as he acts instead of the embodied form practical thinking
(including intending) takes, namely, doing something, acting. One’s doings are typically
accurately described by those, as Anscombe says, “grown to the age of reason in the same
world.”16
To sum up, Cartesianism’s direction of intention is a non-starter. For, one naturally asks,
“with what intent does one direct one’s intent?” Moreover, the underlying view of mind as
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entirely speculative simply cannot serve as a sound moral psychology. For it fails as a
psychology (especially of action). Rather, it is a false theory that threatens to undermine our
(self-) understanding of the very real phenomenon that prompted recourse to it: embodied
psyche. Let us now turn to Anscombe’s second culprit.
I.b. Proportionalism.
The much more novel (and, correspondingly, both less chronic and much easier to
counter) corruption of double effect arises out of (ironically) a Consequentialist reading of
Aquinas’ original account of double effect. Anscombe refers to this as the, “package Doctrine of
Double Effect.”17
In the article inaugurating this most recent abuse of double effect (and corruption of
Catholic moral theology), the Jesuit theologian Peter Knauer considers St. Thomas’ discussion of
double effect (S.t., IIaIIae, q. 64, a. 7) as the paradigm of what will come to be called,
“Proportionalism.” In the relevant passage, Aquinas straightforwardly notes that:
some act arising from a good intention can be made
unlawful if it is not proportionate to the end
(proportionatus fini). And, therefore, if someone defending
his own life uses more force than necessary, it would be
illicit.18
Thomas here makes a standard stipulation concerning justified force; namely, more than
necessary force undermines permissibility.19 Aquinas proposes (and does so clearly) that the
disproportion vitiates the otherwise good act (otherwise good in part due to the – still – good
intent), rendering it illicit. Here, by contrast, is Knauer:
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[i]n sinning a man seeks a real good, but his act in its total
existential entirety is not proportioned to this good. Then
the evil arising thereby, whether it is desired or not, belongs
objectively to the act and is objectively what is
“intended.”20
Knauer misunderstands Thomas to hold that if an act lacks the noted proportion, the agent
thereby intends the bad at issue. Aquinas does not assert, however, that lack of proportion alters
the good intention. (Indeed, his focus upon object, end, and circumstances in act-evaluation
prevents exactly such a reductive account. For the lack of proportion (a circumstance) obtains
independently of the object and end – upon which intent bears). Rather, and to reiterate, Thomas
notes a perennial commonplace: disproportionate force renders an otherwise permissible act
impermissible. In effect, Knauer employs a gross Consequentialist approach to eliminate the role
of intent; he reduces intent to a function of the balance of good over evil. Anscombe
understandably rejects such a confused account.21 The, “package Doctrine of Double Effect,” or
Proportionalism amounts to a consequentialist corruption of the correct moral insight found in
the I/F distinction. Let us turn now to her, “principle of side effects.”
II. Anscombe’s Principle of Side Effects.
In 1982 on the occasion of her receipt of the Aquinas Medal, Anscombe delivered a paper
entitled, “Medalist’s Address: Action, Intention and ‘Double Effect’”. In it she proposes her,
“principle of side-effects”:
I will call it the ‘principle of side-effects’ that the
prohibition on murder does not cover all bringing about of
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deaths which are not intended. Not that such deaths aren’t
often murder. But the quite clear and certain prohibition on
intentional killing (with the relevant ‘public’ exceptions)
does not catch you when your action brings about an
unintended death. (original emphasis)22
By “murder”, Anscombe means wrongful killing of the innocent, intentional or otherwise:
there can be borderline cases arising because murder is not
committed only where there was an intention to kill. The
arsonist who burns down a house, not caring that there are
people there, is as much a murderer if they are burned to
death by his action, as if he had aimed to kill them. This
action falls squarely within a penumbra surrounding the
hard-core part of the concept of murder, which contains
only intentional killing. The penumbra is fuzzy at the outer
edges – that is, there are borderline cases. But that fact does
not mean that an absolute prohibition on murder makes no
sense.23
Given the reasonableness of an absolute prohibition against murder, the principle of side-effects
(or something like it) becomes necessary.24 For, otherwise, as Anscombe illustrates the point:
you can’t build roads and fast vehicles, you can’t have
various sports and races, you can’t have ships voyaging
over the seas, without its being predictable that there will
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be deaths resulting.25
So, the principle of side effects defines the set of cases that are not necessarily wrong (as
intentional killings of the innocent). As she notes, “the principle is modest: it says ‘where you
must not aim at someone’s death, causing it does not necessarily incur guilt’” (original
emphasis).26
Anscombe goes on, saying:
[t]he principle is unexceptionably illustrated by some
examples of dangerous surgery, by some closings of doors
to contain fire or water; or by having ships and airlines. In
these we are helped by thinking of the deaths as either
remote or uncertain.27
Anscombe notes that the principle of side effects, “does not say when you may foreseeably cause
death” (original emphasis).28 However, the above-mentioned unexceptionable cases with
reference to the remoteness or uncertainty of the outcomes suggest that we have two features to
focus upon: the remoteness of the foreseen bad outcome or its uncertainty.
Take remoteness first. Consider flood doors in a submarine. When closed to prevent the
deaths of the entire crew (and the submarine’s sinking), the deaths of the submariners in the
flooded section, although certain, are remote. For one closes the doors and at some remove
(causally and temporally, subsequent to the compartment’s filling with water), the submariners
die.
Now, take uncertainty. To consider examples Anscombe herself proposes, we
legitimately fly airplanes, launch ships, build roads, and manufacture cars although we know that
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doing so will result in the deaths of innocents. For while those deaths are foreseen with statistical
certitude they are not individually foreseen as certain. For example, we know with (statistical)
certitude that given a certain number of flights, a certain number of deaths due to crashes will
occur. This certitude does not make flying planes a violation of the absolute prohibition against
murder. Were we, however, to fly a specific plane knowing with certitude that its flying would
result in the deaths of innocents, we would apparently be culpable of murder, regardless of our
not intending that result.
Again, we have Anscombe’s proposal that:
[h]aving accepted the principle of side effects, we need
some further principle or principles on which to judge the
unintended causing of death. There is one which both
seems obvious and covers a good many cases. The intrinsic
certainty of the death of the victim, or its great likelihood
from the nature of the case, would exclude moving the rock
[in the famous cave-explorer case]. Here is a reasonable
principle. Surgery would be thought murderous, even
though it was not done to kill, but, say, to get an organ for
someone else, if the death of the subject were expected as a
near consequence, pretty certain from the nature of the
operation.29
From the above, it appears as if the principle of side effects complemented by the remoteness
(not a, “near consequence,”) or lack of certainty of the foreseen outcome secures permissibility
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of the contemplated action. This appears to me to be the import of Professor Anscombe’s
principle of side effects.
I want to propose, apparently in contrast to her account (I am loathe to admit), that while
proximity (if I may use that as opposed to remoteness) and certitude of an innocent’s death as a
foreseen but not intended consequence of what one does often constitute murder (as, for example
in the arsonist and organ-transplantation cases Professor Anscombe mentions), they need not (as
she herself elsewhere acknowledges in a case of terminal sedation which I take to instance both
proximate and certain death).30
In her rejection of the, “package Doctrine of Double Effect,” (or, Proportionalism),
Anscombe says:
[t]he Principle of Side Effects says no more than that
moving the rock is not excluded by the prohibition on
intentional killing. For, as I have explained it, that principle
is not a package deal and it does not say what
circumstances or needs excuse unintended causing of death.
Some principle or principles are needed, and if we adopt
that one principle, of the balance of good over evil in the
expected upshot, then it becomes obscure why we could not
do this where the causation of death was perfectly
intentional. And that seems to be the principal ground on
which some thinkers throw the whole package out of the
window, and talk about a deliberate killing, for example, as
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so far a ‘pre-moral’ evil’. ... the nerve of the rejection of
former doctrine is here.(original emphasis)31
In order to determine permissibility in a case where one foresees death as a concomitant of one’s
act, with what does one complement the I/F distinction? Anscombe suggests that complementing
the I/F distinction with quasi-consequentialist considerations (the balance of good over evil)
makes it difficult to argue that one could not have recourse to the balance of good over evil in a
case involving an outright intent to kill. Or, as she says, “it becomes obscure why we could not
do this where the causation of death was perfectly intentional.”
In what follows, I hope to clear up this obscurity and show the reasonableness of a
standard account of double effect in which the I/F distinction functions in conjunction with
unobjectionable quasi-consequentialist considerations. I will do so in broadly AristotelianThomistic (and Anscombian) terms. I will begin with a brief presentation of Aquinas’ account of
double effect, subsequently moving on to focus on the ethical relevance of the I/F distinction.
III. A (Sound) Account of Double Effect.
In the locus classicus of double effect (Summa theologiae, IIaIIae, q. 64, a.7), the great
Dominican friar considers the (Natural Law) licitness of a private individual’s homicidal act of
self-defense. He says:
[n]othing prevents one act from having two effects, of
which only one is intended, the other being besides the
intention (praeter intentionem). Now moral acts receive
their character according to that which is intended, not,
however, from that which is praeter intentionem, since this
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is accidental, as is evident from what has been said earlier
[S.t., IIa-IIae, q. 43, a. 3, c.]. Thus, from the act of selfdefense, two effects may follow: one, the conservation of
one’s own life; the other, the death of the attacker
(invadentis). Since what is intended is the conservation of
one’s own life, such an act is not illicit: it is natural for each
thing to preserve itself in existence for as long as it is able.
Nevertheless, some act proceeding from a good intention
may be rendered illicit if it is not proportioned to the end
(proportionatus fini). Thus, it would not be licit if someone
defending his own life were to use more force than
necessary. But, if he repels force with moderation, his
defensive act will be licit: for, according to the jurists, “it is
licit to repel force by force, with the moderation of a
blameless defense.”32 Nor is it necessary for salvation that a
man forego an act of moderate force in order to avoid the
death of another: since one is more responsible to care for
one’s own life than someone else’s. But, since to kill a man
is not licit except for the public authority acting for the sake
of the common good (as is evident from what was
previously said [S.t., IIa-IIae, q.64, a.3, c.]), it is not licit for
a man to intend to kill (intendat occidere) in order to
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defend himself, except for those who have public authority.
These, intending to kill a man in self-defense, refer this to
the public good. This is evident in the case of a soldier
fighting an enemy, and in the case of a minister of the
judge fighting against thieves. Nevertheless, even these
would sin if they were moved by private animosity.33
To avoid initial confusion about St. Thomas’ account, a number of points bear notice. First, as he
says here, Aquinas considers it legitimate for one having public authority to intend to kill in selfdefense. (Notably, in the aside at the end of the corpus he rejects officers of the polity killing
with Dirty-Harry-“make-my-day” private animosity.) Thus, in the article, he addresses the case
of a private individual whose act of self-defense results in the assailant’s death. Second (and an
allied point), Aquinas considers this case assuming that the relevant polity has not granted a
private individual the authority to intend to kill in self-defense. He does so while clearly
indicating that a polity could grant that authority. Indeed, it has authorized soldiers and its
officers in need of such authority to intend to kill in self-defense. Thus, absent a polity legalizing
intentional killing in self-defense, the natural law defaults to prohibiting a private individual
from intending to kill an aggressor in self-defense. A polity, however, may deputize, as it were,
its citizens to intend to kill in defense of self (and others).34 Third, we must avoid imagining the
defense Aquinas has in mind anachronistically, involving exclusively offensive and
determinatively lethal weapons such as pistols. Needless to say, Aquinas does not have such
weapons in mind. Rather, as the sed contra taken from Exodus 22:2 suggests, Thomas imagines
an assailant suffering injury that proves fatal, e.g., a physical struggle, perhaps involving a knife,
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sword or item at hand, not the shooting of an aggressor.35 Fourth and finally, to understand
Aquinas’ account, we must keep in mind the Dionysian dictum: “the good arises from causal
integrity; the bad from any single defect.”36 As St. Thomas tells us elsewhere, the good act will
be wholly good, particularly with respect to what is done (object/deed), why it is done (end), and
in what circumstances it is done.37 The bad act will fall short in any of these respects.
With the above caveats in mind, let us consider St. Thomas’ inaugural double-effect
analysis. Most prominently, he employs the intentionem/praeter intentionem (intended/beside the
intention) distinction. We customarily speak of what is praeter intentionem as foreseen but not
intended or, simply, foreseen. While not Aquinas’ terminology, I think it accurately conveys
what he has in mind, although the contrast might be more accurately spoken of as the
intended/voluntary distinction. As Aquinas’ discussion of the case indicates, what is praeter
intentionem is voluntary (knowingly willingly brought about), yet not intended. As voluntary, the
agent is fully responsible for what he causes praeter intentionem. Were the praeter intentionem
not voluntary, Aquinas would have nothing further to say concerning the (praeter intentionem)
death of the assailant. What is beside the intention has relevance in act-evaluation as a
circumstance of the act (circum-stare, something standing around); however, it does not define
the act as intent does.
Intent, like an act, is complex, bearing on means and end. We will the end, choose the
means, and intend the end-through-means. To employ Thomas’ example, we will health, choose
medicine, and intend health-through-medicine.38 Our act is one of taking aspirin to be healthy.
As Anscombe notes, it answers “how?” (taking aspirin) and “why?” (for health) questions.39 The
means answers “how?”; the end answers “why?”. As intent includes both, it plays a crucial role
in act-analysis. Of course, as Anscombe memorably puts it, “an object is not what what is aimed
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at is; the description under which it is aimed at is that under which it is called the object”
(original emphasis).40 Moreover, as Miss Anscombe says, “to call an action intentional is to say
it is intentional under some description.”41 This description is the verbal form the agent’s intent
takes. Thus, “swallowing a little white thing,” although a true description, does not get at the
intentional act, “taking an aspirin for my health.”
With these distinctions in mind, consider Thomas’ specific case. The intent is, “defendoneself to preserve one’s life.” In this intent, we find: first, the answer to “how?”, the means or
object of self-defense (tutelae); and, second, the answer to “why?”, the end of self-preservation
(conservatio propriae vitae). If we are correct in our act-analysis, we have the object and the end
to be evaluated. What of this end? Is it ethically legitimate? As St. Thomas notes, it is natural for
each thing to keep itself in existence. Indeed, we here recall Aquinas’ ordering of the precepts of
the natural law’s first principle: “do and pursue good; avoid evil.”42 To the first order of precepts
belong those bearing on the, “preservation of human life and preventing of the contrary.”43 Thus,
the intended end, self-preservation, is eminently licit.
What of the means, the object, self-defense (absent intent to kill)? As we have seen, the
deed of self-defense could lack proportion towards the licit end of self-preservation were one to
use more force than necessary. The use of more than necessary force would be one of those
defects that could render an otherwise licit object illicit. Here we encounter the good friar’s
common sense. As St. Thomas notes at the outset of q.64, homicide is, “the greatest harm to
one’s neighbor.”44 Indeed, because it is the greatest of harms, it belongs – as Thomas notes,
again in the proemium to q. 64 – amongst those that are inflicted on our neighbor against his
will. Accordingly, just as inflicting harm at all when none is necessary would render the object of
self-defense illicit (say one could easily cross the street), so, too, does using more than necessary
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force. Moderate self-defense, however, does not suffer this defect of disproportion. Thus far, we
have assessed the act of moderate self-defense undertaken for self-preservation resulting in the
assailant’s (not intended) death as licit. Yet, if the assailant’s death has the character of malum,
or something to be avoided (evitandum occisionem alterius) as it no doubt does, why not
absolutely avoid it?
St. Thomas answers this reasonable question by noting that a man is more bound to care
for his own life than that of another.45 That is, one has a greater responsibility to preserve one’s
own life than one has to preserve another’s. Accordingly, it is licit for a private individual
moderately to defend his own life absent the intent to kill. How may we state the criteria
discernible in Aquinas’ account more generally?
Notably, St. Thomas does not set forth a general account to deal with double-effect
cases.46 I propose the following as a more general account of double effect. An otherwise licit act
effecting good and bad is licit if the agent:
1) intends the good while not intending the bad (either as
an end or as a means),
2) effects the least bad practically necessary
(proportionatus fini), and
3) has a greater or comparable obligation to pursue the
good than to avoid effecting the bad at issue.47
The above conditions are each necessary and together suffice to render licit an act of double
effect.
Here, we find our final quarry. Anscombe as well as opponents of an intention-sensitive
ethic (e.g., her nemesis, the Consequentialist) raise a difficulty concerning the fourth condition:
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if we adopt that one principle, of the balance of good over
evil in the expected upshot, then it becomes obscure why
we could not do this where the causation of death was
perfectly intentional.48
Of course, there are diverse (Consequentialist, or Deontological, or Natural Law) construals of,
“greater or comparable obligation.” Not all concur with the more straightforwardly
Consequentialist, “balance of good over evil,” way of putting the point. I will put this difference
to the side. For it is not the current source of disagreement. Rather, the difficulty Anscombe
shares with the Consequentialist goes to the heart of the I/F distinction and to DER, also. How
can intent have moral relevance such that were the agent to intend the bad, the act would be ruled
out of bounds, while absent such intent, the bad still counts against the act but not so as to render
it illicit? This is the obscurity I hope to illuminate. I will do so by considering the moral import
of the difference between the intended and the foreseen but not intended (or what I will call the
simply voluntary).49
IV. The Intended/Simply Voluntary Distinction.
Paraphrasing Aristotle, those who evaluate agents and acts as virtuous or vicious must
first determine what makes an agent an agent and an act an act.50 One errs who considers this
need unique to a Eudaimonistic account. E.g., the Consequentialist also must first articulate what
makes action action. Indeed, every investigation faces this requirement of an account concerning
what is being looked into, its subject matter. Biologists demarcate the living from the non-living;
zoologists, the animal from the non-animal; ornithologists, birds from other animals; and so on.
Ethics is no different. It, too, must give an account of its subject matter. Accordingly, we must
first delimit our field of study: the voluntary.
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Here, it would be difficult to improve on Aristotle’s account. Aristotle (logically)
contrasts the voluntary (X6@LF\@4H) from the not voluntary. Amongst the not voluntary (along
with necessary occurrences such as solstices, natural occurrences such as growing old and dying,
and chance occurrences such as finding a treasure) belongs the counter-voluntary (•6@bF4@H)
such as the wind blowing sailors off course. To the countervoluntary belong acts (subsequently
regretted) done either by ignorance (*4’ –(<@4"<) of the particulars of which an action consists
or by force ($\‘). Aristotle notes (non-controversially) that ignorance does not always constitute
the counter-voluntary. In determining which types of ignorance cause actions to be
countervoluntary by ignorance (the preposition indicates the ignorance as causal), Aristotle
excludes ignorance of which the agent is culpable as that of the drunk who acts in the ignorance
which she voluntarily caused by her drunkenness. He also excludes ignorance of what is actually
virtuous or vicious for which ignorance the agent is responsible (as joint cause of her character).
Excluding what occurs by ignorance or by force (counter-voluntarily), by nature, by necessity, or
by chance, we have the voluntary. More positively, the voluntary is a knowing-wanting.
The voluntary constitutes the subject matter of ethics. As Anscombe (following Aquinas
following Aristotle) notes, one need add no further characteristic to a human action (other than
its voluntariness by which it is a human action) in virtue of which it becomes subject to moral
evaluation.51 Rather, one need merely note its voluntary, knowing-willing character. I.e., that it
was, indeed, an action. Immediately, it thereby becomes subject to ethical evaluation as either
integrally good or defectively bad. Correspondingly, one need only establish that a happening
involving one was not knowingly-willingly brought about by one’s self (“I tripped, was pushed,
blown by the wind, ...”), and the happening (and oneself) are not subject to ethical appraisal.
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This is a remarkable commonplace. Moreover, it is full of import for our purposes.
Remarkable, because it emphatically points towards our psychological nature. A commonplace;
for children readily recognize its truth on the playground (“he shoved me into you”) while all
criminal law abides by it in the venerable, “actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea,” or, simply,
mens rea.52 It is full of import because it points us towards what has the most basic ethical
relevance; namely, states of knowing-willing mind. E.g., were one without knowledge or will to
function as a crucial link in a catastrophic causal chain, there would be no subject matter for
ethical evaluation – no matter how dire the consequences. Conversely, (paraphrasing Kant) an
unlucky Mother Theresa who through no fault of her own fails to relieve human suffering
remains good as do her fruitless acts. Before moving on to consider the difference between the
simply voluntary and the deliberate, chosen, and intended, I want to delimit and offer a few
examples of what I have in mind when I speak of the simply voluntary.
Many of our doings are simply voluntary, things we do knowingly and willingly, yet
without further epistemic or volitional features concerning them. By the simply voluntary I do
not mean what we once deliberated about but now do by habit, for example, driving a car. The
simply voluntary refers to those acts that do not rise to the level of requiring deliberation, just
being instances of knowing and willing, period. Moreover, by the simply voluntary I do not
mean an act that cannot be done deliberately. (I doubt that there are such acts.) Perhaps more
importantly, by the phrase, “concerning them,” (speaking of elements belonging to one act) I
mean to indicate that the simply voluntary could be an element of a deliberate act, but not in
virtue of itself being deliberate. E. g., while I deliberately swim in a pool, I simply voluntarily
displace water from the pool. Notably, many acts of young children (toddlers) are simply
voluntary, not involving anything more than knowing-willing. Keeping such caveats in mind,
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one knowingly and willingly eats, drinks, walks, sits, stands, looks at, listens to, talks to, runs
one’s fingers through one’s hair, and so on.
With this (rough) sense of the simply voluntary in place, consider the deliberate, chosen,
and intended in contrast to the simply voluntary.53 To deliberate about how to achieve one’s end,
to choose means, and to intend one’s end through those means are each themselves simply
voluntary. Unlike the simply voluntary that we share broadly with young children and many
animals (e.g., dogs) adult humans paradigmatically act with choice, deliberation, and intent.
Accordingly, because such acts originate from a deliberated will (ex voluntate deliberata)
Aquinas speaks of them as, “properly human.”54 Moreover, these actions concerning our own
actions (choosing, deliberating, and intending) instance the human tendency to rise above our
own activity and take it as our object. Just as we know that we know and will that we will, so we
act (deliberate, choose, and intend) concerning our own actions. We deliberate about how to
achieve our willed end; upon discovery via deliberation we choose our own deeds as means; and,
finally, we intend those deeds as means and the effects we produce by them as ends.
Now, since knowing-willing demarcates that which is subject to moral evaluation from
that which is not, further differences within the knowing-willing have further ethical relevance.
For these further differences ramify, articulate, develop, and unfold within ethics implications of
the first morally important distinction (between the voluntary and the not voluntary). At this
point, however, instead of contrasting what has ethical import from what does not, the contrast at
issue is within the voluntary and, thereby, within the ethical. Thus, only within the voluntary do
we find properly ethical distinctions between, for example, the licit and illicit, the virtuous and
the vicious, the just and unjust, the right and wrong, and so on. Following our very first
distinction (between what is duly associated with the mental states of knowing and willing and,
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thereby, subject to moral evaluation and what is not, and, thereby, not subject to such
evaluation), we look initially at diverse mental states in making these properly ethical
distinctions.
To illustrate the moral difference between the intended and the simply voluntary (the I/F
distinction), allow me to employ a standard pair of contrasted cases: terror and tactical bombing.
Consider the intended elements found in terror bombing. To terrorize civilians one deliberates
about and chooses means productive of that end. So, for example, if one determines that fire
bombs best maim, kill, terrorize, and demoralize civilians, then one chooses them. One tactically
bombs to destroy a military installation (say an arms-depot), and, thereby, advance the cause of
victory. The destruction of the depot is the proximate end. So, for example, if one determines
that fire bombs best destroy it, then one decides upon them as one’s means. Tactical bombing
instances the deliberately decided upon destruction of a military target concomitantly harming
(in the double-effect cases) the non-combatant populace.
Now, to consider the two acts, stipulate comparable consequences. Thus, both acts do
terrorize, kill, and maim civilians (comparably) while destroying the depot; both undermine
support for the war and impede the enemy’s military. Similarly, both advance the cause of
victory. Why, then, contrast the two acts in question? (Here is our obscurity.)
First, not to contrast the two acts is to employ superficial (as Anscombe suggests,
“shallow,”) inadequate, and childish (in the sense of, “fit for children, not adults,”) criteria for
act-evaluation. Second, to do so is entirely to ignore the prominent varied viciousness of terror
bombing in contrast to the absence of the same in tactical bombing.
Consider the first charge of superficiality. Amongst our acts we can readily contrast those
that are simply voluntary (walking) from those that in addition to being voluntary are
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deliberately decided upon (teaching). Insofar as deliberately decided upon acts more intimately
and deeply involve thinking-wanting, they more fully instance a human act (knowing-willing).
They are more fully, more completely, more deeply human acts. For this reason, they belong
characteristically to adult, mature humans. For such humans robustly plan, order, and design
their acts fully exercising their capacities as thinkers and willers. While children and animals act
voluntarily, adult humans in their capacity as adult humans act with deliberate decision, or
complete, full thinking-willing. Accordingly, when we evaluate deliberately decided upon acts,
we must do so giving due prominence to those elements of the act which render it deliberately
decided upon. Otherwise, our assessments lack depth. That is, we would be evaluating an act as
if it were simply voluntary and not also decided upon deliberately. We would employ a standard
fit only for a child’s or (and I say this with no disparagement to the child) a dog’s act to an
adult’s action. (To revise Gertrude Stein’s dictum, “There is more there there.” Thus, one needs
more in one’s act-evaluation to capture the more that is there.)
Moreover, and this brings me to my second claim, we would fail to get at the act as
vicious (or virtuous). For, as Aristotle says, decision best instances virtue (and vice). Indeed, as
the very definition of virtue indicates, deliberate decision exemplifies the essence of virtue (and
vice).55
Now, consider our two consequentially comparable acts in terms of virtue and vice. With
respect to vice, terror bombing is while tactical bombing is not, “murderous, bloody, savage,
extreme, rude, cruel.”56 Terror bombing targets the innocent, the harmless, those who do not
threaten (in nocere), the defense-less with a view to inflicting pain, suffering, despair, and terror
upon them. Thereby, it is unjust, murderous and cowardly. It is unjust: for only the violent merit
violence; to render violence upon the harmless is not due. It is murderous: purposefully to kill
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the innocent, as terror bombing does, is to murder. It is cowardly bullying: it targets the
defenseless who do not threaten. It is savage, extreme, rude, and cruel: for it exemplifies the
abandonment of that high civility by which the strong and powerful direct lethal fury only upon
those who might do likewise to them. Indeed, to call it lupine is to insult the wolf who is better to
wolf than man is to man in countenancing the various vices exemplified in terror bombing.
By contrast, tactical bombing targets sources and agents of violence such as an artillery
installation and those who man it. Thereby, it is just. For violence is due the violent. Nor do the
deaths of the innocent render it murderous. For it does not aim at the innocent; rather, they are
(unfortunately) proximate to the (just) violence it does instance. Nor need tactical bombing
incorporate cowardice. For a military target typically poses a threat to those who seek to destroy
it. Nor is tactical bombing barbarous, extreme, rude, or cruel. For by it one does not seek out
civilians as targets and thereby betray a venerable achievement of civilization. Namely, that by
which the awful violence of war be directed against those who bear arms. Of course, one would
go too far were one not to note room for criticism of tactical bombing. It may instance
callousness and indifference to the suffering of others. Certainly, one would err if one were
positively to recommend it. For while it need not incorporate malice towards the noncombatants, it is certainly not a benevolent act; indeed, it does nothing but harm to them.
Nonetheless, as the I/F (or, more precisely, the Intended/Simply Voluntary) distinction indicates,
terror bombing necessarily exemplifies a variously vicious (barbarous, murderous, unjust, and
cowardly) deed while tactical bombing need not.
In summation, the I/F distinction captures ethically relevant differences between
consequentially comparable acts. It ramifies (the morally relevant side of) ethic’s founding
distinction between the voluntary and the not voluntary. The intended aspects of an act bear
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profoundly on act-evaluation insofar as they index the depth of the voluntary. Ethicists who do
not acknowledge the import of the I/F distinction inevitably make shallow act-evaluations.
Moreover, they lack the resources by which to assess an act’s exemplification of virtue or vice.
To conclude, recall Anscombe’s exhortation:
[i]t would be a great improvement if, instead of “morally
wrong,” one always names a genus such as “untruthful,”
“unchaste,” “unjust.” We should no longer ask whether
doing something was “wrong,” passing directly from some
description of an action to this notion; we should ask
whether, e.g., it was unjust; and the answer would
sometimes be clear at once.57
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can during the day the nature of the threat (theft or grievous bodily
harm). Moreover, during the day he can more easily secure assistance
from neighbors. Although this interpretation of the text slightly differs
from St. Thomas’ suggestion that what we here find justified is
homicide in defense of one’s house, it vindicates his use of it. For the
crucial point he makes stands. Namely, the Scriptural authority
grounds the licitness of a private individual’s act of self-defense that
results in the (at night-time, presumed) assailant’s death. In fact, the
text is even more to his point than St. Thomas’ construal of it. For as
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than the obligation to avoid the evil, it would be obligatory to engage
in the contemplated act. Although Aquinas does not extend his account
to such cases, I think it licit to act if the obligations are comparable in
gravity. Of course, in such cases, acting would not be obligatory. In
short, a reasonable person might remain ambivalent about what he
ought to do. For example, a terminally ill patient might correctly judge
it licit to forego or undergo terminal sedation (the aforementioned
pain-relieving and death-dealing drug).
48.Anscombe, “Medalist’s Address,” 24; also found in Human Life,
224.
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49.Anscombe describes the foreseen but not intended as voluntary:
[s]omething is voluntary though not intentional if it is the
antecedently known concomitant result of one’s intentional
action, so that one could have prevented it if one would
have given up the action; but it is not intentional; one
rejects the question ‘Why?’ in its connection (Intention,
section 49, 89).
50.To anticipate an objection that itself merits an entire paper, I differ
with those critics of the I/F distinction who would draw an almost
dichotomous distinction between the morally salient aspects we attend
to in our evaluations of acts and those we rely on in our assessments of
agents. Certainly, act and agent-assessment differ; the one is not the
other. This truth, however, does not ground a typical charge against
DER: that it erroneously takes an ethically important matter in agentevaluation (the agent’s intent or lack thereof) as an ethically relevant
matter in act-evaluation. Many critics of DER typically have recourse
to this move to accommodate the widely shared intuition (captured by
DER) that intent morally differs from foresight of comparable bad
consequences. They propose that intent matters in agent, but not in actevaluation. So, for example, such thinkers might hold that the terror
bomber is a worse agent than the tactical bomber, but an act of terror
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bombing does not morally differ from a consequentially comparable
act of tactical bombing. (See, for example, Judith Jarvis Thomson,
“Physician-Assisted Suicide: Two Moral Arguments,” Ethics 109
(1999): 497-518, at 517 and T. M. Scanlon, Moral Dimensions:
Permissibility, Meaning, Blame (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 2008), 20-36). As an attempt to make a place for the ubiquitous
intuition, however, the move fails. For the intuition concerns both act
and agent, as one who proposes the I/F distinction would expect. There
is, of course, much to be said concerning the relation between actevaluation (sometimes referred to as first-order morality), agentevaluation (sometimes spoken of as second-order morality), and DER.
For further consideration of the topic, see T. A. Cavanaugh, DoubleEffect Reasoning: Doing Good and Avoiding Evil (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 2006), 122-34; see also, T. A. Cavanaugh, “Double-effect
Reasoning Defended: A Response to Scanlon,” Proceedings of the
American Catholic Philosophical Association, 86 (2012): 267-79.
51.See Aristotle at Nicomachean Ethics III.1; Aquinas at S.t. IaIIae, q.
18, a. 9; and Anscombe in “Medalist’s Address,” 13-20 (also found in
Human Life, 209 et passim).
52.We are told (by Frederick Pollock and Frederic Maitland in The
History of English Law Before the Time of Edward I, second edition, 2
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vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1952), 2:476) that the
phrase can be traced back at least to Augustine’s comment on perjury:
“[r]eam linguam non facit mens rea,” “[p]erjury does not exist absent
the mental element” (Augustine, Sermones, No. 180, c.2., Migne,
Patrol. Vol. 38, col. 974). In other words, simply saying something
under oath that is false does not constitute perjury; one must also
intend, thereby, to deceive those to whom one speaks.
53.I am not going to develop the differences between deliberation,
choice, and intention. Briefly, I note the following. Intent concerns
end-via-means and issues from deliberation. Choice concerns means
and also issues from deliberation. Deliberation issues from the willing
of an end. Given the willed end, deliberation determines the means by
which one achieves one’s end. One might abandon deliberation and
thus not choose means and thus not intend end and means. The
intended (end-through-means) is chosen (in respect of its means) and
deliberate (in respect of both).
54.Aquinas, S.t., IaIIae, q.1., a.1, c..
55.Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, “virtue is a habit of deciding,” “Z

•D,J¬ ª>4H BD@"4D,J46Z,” (1106b36).
56.Shakespeare, Sonnet 129, 3-4. (This paragraph relies on my,
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“Aristotle’s Voluntary/Deliberate Distinction, Double Effect and
Ethical Relevance,” International Philosophical Quarterly,
forthcoming.
57.Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy,” 8-9; also available in
Human Life, 180.
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